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THE POLITICS OF GALILEO
1  
BY JOHAN LEMBKE 
Background to the Galileo Project 
Europe had virtually no presence in satellite navigation in the 1990s.  The two existing 
global satellite navigation systems were the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and the 
Russian Federation’s Glonass constellation.  Basically, there was no military pressure for 
satellite navigation in Europe before the 1990s as there was in the US.  Policymakers and 
industrialists in Europe acquired an incentive to develop satellite navigation when GPS was 
made available to civilian users and when conflicts erupted close to the European borders in the 
1990s. Then a race developed for market share and strategic independence.  The belief that GPS, 
a militarily-controlled system, would not become accessible to the public had helped to keep 
European ambitions on the backburner.
2 
Aside from some preliminary work in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the first political 
initiative came in 1994, when the European Commission launched a proposal for Europe to 
engage in satellite navigation.
3  The initiative prepared the ground for the development of the 
first-generation of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS-1) called Egnos (European 
Geostationary Overlay System), scheduled to enter operation in 2003. GNSS-1 was intended to 
give Europe the experience it needed to launch a second-generation satellite system (GNSS-2), 
which in early 1999 was dubbed “Galileo.” 
                                                 
1I wish to thank those officials in the European space sector at national and European levels who offered 
their valuable time to discuss the EU satellite navigation policy. I also acknowledge, with gratitude, the 
assistance of Martin Staniland, Professor at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and 
Robin Skulrak, masters student at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs and editorial 
assistant, in editing the policy paper. 
2ESA official, interview with author, 23 October 2000.  
3Commission of the European Communities (1994), Satellite Navigation Services: A European Approach, 
COM (94) 248, Brussels.   5 
The world civil aviation community set the tone.  In the early 1980s, it became interested in 
using satellite-based navigation aids for such critical purposes as enabling aircraft to land in bad 
weather and at night depending exclusively on satellite navigation.  Because of the increasing 
restrictions of current air navigation systems and the high annual cost of operating conventional 
ground-based infrastructure in the early 1990s, the aviation community intensified its efforts to 
develop a strategy that would allow a gradual transition from conventional navigation systems to 
global navigation satellite systems. 
  The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) took the lead in this campaign.
4  It 
was searching for ways to increase airspace capacity, provide substantial economies in flight 
operations and enhance the punctuality of air transport.
5  In 1991, ICAO proposed the 
Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) concept, 
which involved, as a first stage, the establishment of a global navigation satellite system around 
2005, with a second system (GNSS-2) - relying on a civil satellite constellation – to be installed 
around 2010. ICAO’s activities, a tender issued by the international satellite service provider 
                                                 
4 The ICAO was created in 1944 to promote the safe and orderly development of civil aviation worldwide 
and is a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN).  Headquartered in Montreal, ICAO develops 
inter-national air transport standards and regulations and serves as the medium for cooperation in all 
fields of civil aviation among its 185 Contracting States (as of the year 2000).  This global undertaking 
has been viewed as the most complex and far-reaching initiative ever pursued in the history of civil 
aviation.  As such, it required an unprecedented level of collaboration between aircraft operators, service 
providers, manufacturers, interested associations and organizations, and governments, all working 
together with the goal of building the safest global aviation system.  The objective of the world aviation 
community has been to create an integrated global system of air traffic management linking together 
CNS/ATM systems. 
5 In 1997, total world airline schedule passenger traffic in terms of passenger-kilometers was expected to 
grow at an average annual rate of 5.5 percent over the period to 2005.  The total growth in freight traffic 
over the same period was estimated to be even stronger and amount to 7.0 percent annually in terms of 
freight ton-kilometers.  Finally, the annual total number of domestic and international aircraft departures 
on scheduled services was estimated to grow more than a quarter and the number of aircraft-kilometers 
flown by more than a half.  The international routes that would experience the fastest growth in passenger 
traffic would be the Transpacific and Euro-Asia/Pacific ones. ICAO (1997), ‘Growth in Air Traffic to 
Continue: ICAO Releases Long-Term Forecasts’, Press Release, Montreal, March.   6 
Inmarsat in 1994 for the use of satellite transponders, and the growing use of the US GPS 
constellation for non-military services triggered the launching of European efforts.  
European Initiatives 
In Europe, the emergence of satellite navigation was largely the result of a confluence of 
activities undertaken by three European organizations: the European Space Agency (ESA), 
Eurocontrol (the organization responsible for coordinating air traffic control), and the Directorate 
General for Transport and Energy of the European Commission (DG TREN).  In June 1994, the 
Transport Ministers from members of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) met in 
Copenhagen. They gave two clear Directives to Eurocontrol, the European Commission, ESA 
and ECAC Member States.
6  First, Europe should develop a component of the first-generation 
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS-1).  Second, and more importantly, Europe should be 
in a position to contribute to the second-generation system (GNSS-2).  The former system would 
be based on the US GPS and different augmentation systems, while the latter would constitute a 
future system for civilian-controlled satellite navigation.  The ECAC Directives gave a political 
mandate for formal cooperation between the three European-based organizations.  The European 
Commission responded that it would seek consultation with all the parties concerned to decide 
what was necessary to ensure reliable and efficient position-fixing services for European civil 
users. 
Integrating Transport in Europe   
The European Commission’s view of GPS emphasized the need for coordination at EU 
level to construct, integrate and rationalize trans-European communications and transport 
infrastructures.  It saw the promotion of efficient transport systems as a tool to generate and meet 
demand for deeper European economic and social integration, which in turn required the   7 
integration of different modes of transport (inter-modality).  The density of population in Europe, 
like that in the northeastern and southeastern US, caused congestion and bottlenecks in transport 
systems.  Until the late 1990s, all transportation functions had been managed with ground-based 
infrastructure and technology.  This situation started to change with the introduction and 
expected implementation of satellite-based systems, which could provide the same services – and 
could help to solve the crisis in air traffic management in Europe.  But future satellite navigation 
had to be inter-modal in nature, covering and integrating different transport modes.  
This overall strategy led to cooperation between Eurocontrol and ESA in the 1990s, while 
DG TREN, with support from the then-Commissioners for Research (Cresson), Transport 
(Kinnock) and Industrial Affairs and Telecommunications (Bangemann), actively supported the 
introduction of satellite navigation.  DG TREN, specifically, conceived satellite navigation at an 
early stage not as a space development program but as a broader transport infrastructure 
program.  In addition, there were people within the European Commission who were interested 
in the military potential of Galileo.  Finally, France, Italy and Spain in particular wanted to 
strengthen Europe’s commercial and strategic independence and viewed Galileo more as a public 
service than as a solely commercial enterprise.  
The European Space Industry 
Satellite navigation also offered opportunities for the European industries.  Both ESA and 
national space agencies in Europe were looking for an opportunity to launch a key project, in a 
sector where large-scale European projects were lacking.  The European space industry, which 
has not enjoyed the same amount of public funding and military contracts as the US industry, 
wanted to expand European involvement in space.  Consequently, the ESA Ministerial Council 
invited the ESA Director General to draw up, in close consultation with the EU, a program 
                                                                                                                                                       
6Eurocontrol official, interview with author, 12/21/2000   8 
proposal for a European contribution to a satellite navigation system.
7  Furthermore, the 
European space hardware industry started to recognize the benefits of, and the potential market 
for, satellite navigation equipment.  
The Transport Council’s Decisions  
In 1998, the European Commission provided an outline of available strategy options for 
GNSS-2, which was followed by a refined proposal in February 1999.
8  This proposal also gave 
the system its name – “Galileo.”
9  In June 1999, the EU Transport Council decided that the EU 
should embark on the Galileo definition phase (2000-2001).
10  This decision meant that the EU 
could move ahead with plans to build its own global satellite navigation system, but it did not 
represent a major financial commitment. In November 2000, the European Commission 
published a report on the results of the Galileo definition phase prior to the EU Transport 
Council meeting in late December 2000.
11   
Transport Commissioner Loyola de Palacio argued that the EU Transport Council would be 
crucial for the future of Galileo
12 and she argued for an unequivocal commitment by the 
Community.  In fact, Palacio threatened to withdraw support for Galileo if the EU transport 
ministers did not firmly commit to invest public funds in a timely manner.  The European 
                                                 
7Barbarance, K. et al. (1996), ‘Satellite Navigation Activities: The International Context’, Space Communications 
14:155-161. 
8Commission of the European Communities (1998),  Towards a Trans-European Positioning and 
Navigation Network: A European Strategy for Global Navigation Satellite Systems, COM (1998) 29, 21 
January, Brussels. 
9Commission of the European Communities (1999), Galileo: Involving Europe in a New Generation of 
Satellite Navigation Services, COM (1999) 54, Brussels, February 10. 
10Commission of the European Communities (1999), Galileo: Global Satellite Navigation Services for 
Europe. Meeting of the Council of EU Ministers of Transport, 17 June, Luxembourg; Council (1999), 
Council Resolution of 19 July 1999 on the Involvement of Europe in a New Generation of Satellite 
Navigation Services  – Galileo Definition Phase, 1999/C 221/01, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, August 3. 
11Commission Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on Galileo, COM (2000) 750, 
22 November, Brussels.   9 
Commission has estimated that designing and deploying the Galileo constellation would cost 
about Euro 3.25 billion ($2.86 billion).  It argued that the EU and ESA should invest about Euro 
2.1 billion and the private sector 1.1 billion in the project. A total of Euro 1.1 billion would be 
invested up to 2005 (the development phase).  The European Commission suggested that the 
continuation of Galileo beyond 2001 would be attached to three broad conditions.
13  First, the 
EU would have to deploy an independent satellite navigation system.  Second, adequate 
guarantees for funding would be required, including investment from the private sector of up to 
Euro 1.5 billion for the deployment phase (2006-2007), in order that full Galileo services could 
start in 2008.  Third, an adequate legal and financial framework would be necessary in order to 
attract the private financing needed to operate Galileo, while a provisional, coordinated 
management structure for the project would have to be created in 2001.  
The EU Transport Council’s Deliberations on Galileo 
Despite the urgings of Commissioner Palacio, however, the EU Transport Council decided 
in December 2000 to postpone a firm, unconditional commitment to the development of Galileo, 
a decision that surprised ESA, the European Commission, and the space industry. In February 
2001, the European Commission president, Romano Prodi, nevertheless expressed the hope that 
the EU Council and European Parliament could reach an agreement on Galileo by May. 
The concerns that led to the deferral of a political decision on Galileo related mainly to: 
??Funding and the exact source and size of the Galileo’s revenue streams;  
??Defining security aspects and services; and 
??Arriving at a legal structure for management of the system.  
                                                                                                                                                       
12Commission of the European Communities (2000), ‘Continuation of the Galileo Project: The 
Commission Underlines the Need for Rapid Decisions’, Press Release, 22 November, Brussels. 
13Commission of the European Communities (2000), ‘Continuation of the Galileo Project: The 
Commission Underlines the Need for Rapid Decisions’, Press Release, 22 November, Brussels.   10
Moreover, there were a number of “second-order” topics: how the European Egnos system 
would be integrated with (and what the market potential was for) Galileo; the framework for 
assigning legal liabilities associated with damage or injuries resulting from a potential 
malfunction of the Galileo system; the allocation of frequencies; and the overall design of the 
ground infrastructure. 
Galileo: Public Service or Commercial Infrastructure 
European policy-makers and industrialists involved in deciding on the Galileo project have 
been divided on the speed and scale of commitment.  While all ESA/EU Member States agree 
that the envisaged Galileo infrastructure should be placed under civilian control, they differ over 
the exact nature of the control and the role of the public sector.  Some countries want a lasting 
commitment at the earliest date, while others want to obtain more information before deciding at 
a later date on the entire project.  France, Italy, and Spain, together with the European 
Commission and ESA, belong roughly to the former political grouping.  In addition, together 
with the aforementioned countries, Finland and smaller ESA countries such as Norway and 
Switzerland stress the political-strategic importance of Galileo and view it as a public service 
system.  Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and Sweden want a clear role for and commitment 
by the private sector at an early stage.  Moreover, the latter governments (not necessarily their 
military authorities, however) opposed the idea of using Galileo for military purposes since that 
would jeopardize business investments. 
France has repeatedly stressed that Europe should not subject the Galileo project to detailed 
cost analyses and to the promise of a public-private partnership.  In its view, delays and strategic 
fine-tuning must not cause Europe to miss out on what it considers a unique window of   11
opportunity.
14  The French argument has been accepted by Italy, Norway, Portugal, Spain and 
Switzerland, all of which regard a European navigation system as having a political and strategic 
purpose rather than being purely a source of profit.  They agreed early on that strategic issues 
were driving Galileo and that those issues fell within the domain of the EU.  Germany, the 
Netherlands, and the UK use a more commercial argument, holding that the development of 
Galileo is urgent because of the need to compete in the satellite applications market. 
A Public or a Private Market: Funding Considerations 
The European Commission has stated that financing based on public subsidies (Euro 1.1 
billion) is indispensable for the development and validation phase of Galileo between 2001 and 
2005.  Public funding would come from the EU and ESA budgets, the organizations which share 
responsibility for the development of Galileo.  Moreover, investment from the private sector 
(around Euro 1.5 billion) would be necessary for the deployment phase (2006-2007).  At the end 
of 2000, the cost of Galileo was estimated at Euro 3.25 billion for the period 2001 to 2008, with 
annual operating costs of Euro 220 million.  The total Galileo investment, including investment 
and operating costs, would amount to Euro 7 billion by 2020.  DG TREN compares the cost of 
building Galileo to high-speed train infrastructure, which was a hot topic among EU transport 
ministers.  “The development cost of Galileo corresponds to the development cost of about 100 
km of High Speed Train!”
15  This argument can be even more specific. Thus Pascal Campagne 
writes:  “Public funding during the initial project phases should not be a real problem, given all 
the important political, strategic, and social advantages that Galileo will provide Europe.  For 
                                                 
14Because of its long experience in space affairs, France has been engaged in long-term and detailed analyses, 
including the issues of potential military requirements and obligations toward the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). The question of whether Galileo should be incorporated into a wider and coordinated 
European defense structure, into the EU Member States individually, or whether it should address military aspects at 
all, has been discussed. The European Commission has suggested that the Western European Union (WEU) might 
be a possible partner to deal with security aspects of Galileo.   12
example, the construction of the Innsbruck-Fortezza high-speed train sections (55 kilometers) 
amounts to Euro 3.8 billion, while the development of Galileo is estimated at around Euro 3 
billion.”
16 
Essentially,  the European Commission and EU Member States prefer a clear financial 
commitment on the part of industry and user communities.  The European Commission believes 
that equipment manufacturers and service providers should be involved at an early stage in order 
to ensure full commitment by industry to the design and implementation of Galileo.  In the 
industry’s view, however, European governments would have to spend public funds to bring 
Galileo to the point at which it would be equivalent to GPS before they would invest heavily.
17  
From a commercial point of view, the early stages of Galileo entail too much uncertainty.  
 A central political issue is whether satellite navigation should be offered through a 
publicly funded market or through a privately funded service market.  The main participants 
disagree over whether Galileo can generate commercially significant revenues in the shorter 
term.  They also disagree about the potential size and importance of the market.  The space 
industry claims that forecasts made by the European Commission, based on assumptions about 
the long-term market, are unrealistic because a great degree of uncertainty is involved in the 
early stages.  Astrium, a leading European space hardware producer, has elaborated the figure 
below based on various studies.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
15Tytgat, Luc and Pascal Campagne (2000), ‘Galileo: A New GNSS Designed with and for the Benefit for all Kind 
of Users’, ION GPS 2000, 19-22 September. 
16Campagne, Pascal (2000), ‘The Road Ahead: Galileo Economics’,  Galileo’s World, Special issue (Autumn): 
Building and Using Europe’s Global Navigation Satellite System, pp.18-21. 
17 European industry has prepared to step up efforts to help the European Galileo initiative by coordinating their 
activities. The four largest industry actors in Europe (Alcatel Espace, Alenia Spazio, Astrium GmbH and Astrium 
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Figure I: Galileo Program Cost and Schedule. Source: Astrium, 2001. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Ltd) consolidated into a joint venture, dubbed Galileo Industries. This was a signal at the industrial and political 
level that industry supported the Galileo program while the degree of financial investment remained an open issue. 
Financing Sources (MEuro) 
ESA development programs  590.0 
EC TEN programs    550.0 
5th Framework program           72.5 
Future research programs  600.0 
 
Total Public financing        1812.5 
 Estimated Cost (MEuro) 
  Definition Phase      82.5 
Validation    1130.0 
Deployment  2100.0 
_______________________ 
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     Cost for operations/ 
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The difficulty of accurately determining future market value is closely linked to the debate 
about how the costs for the development of Galileo should be distributed.  European 
governments and the European Commission naturally prefer industry to commit clear financial 
support, while industry is reluctant to invest heavily in the early stages.  Industry wants action 
taken to increase regulatory and operational certainty.  The size of private investment would 
depend on the legal structure created by public authorities for particular commercialization 
services and their official strategies to generate revenue sufficient to maintain the Galileo 
constellation.  Industry suggested that it could help fund deployment costs under a Private 
Financing Investment (PFI) scheme, which has been used in some infrastructure projects across 
Europe.  
In summary, the issue of how investments can be recouped (and how Galileo could run on 
a commercial basis to attract private investment) will remain an open and controversial topic in 
Europe.  Industry has been concerned to make a heavy investment early on in a system that 
would be on the market at the same time as GPS.  The timing of commercial operation would be 
a decisive factor in determining the interest of industry, that is, whether it would be able to make 
a profit from the system from the start. 
The Interim Management Structure 
Galileo has until now been largely a research and development (R&D) oriented program. 
Institutional arrangements are lagging behind.  It is generally recognized that the European 
Commission is not in a position to be an operator of Galileo, while its role as a regulatory 
authority has been widely discussed by the EU Member States.  Regarding the organization and 
management of Galileo, European governments agree that there must be efficient governance for 
the project to allow for democratic influence and political control by all participating countries   15
and private sector organizations.  A problem here is that there is no clearly defined public 
customer for Galileo.  The issue is that of how far European governments are prepared to 
delegate power to the European Commission.  A related problem is in what way the program 
should proceed if no flexible and firm commitment can be reached to move ahead with Galileo in 
a manner that is satisfactory for those governments that view Galileo as an urgent EU priority. 
What will happen if the reluctance of some European governments to proceed rapidly actively 
clashes with the desires of staunch Galileo supporters?  Will the whole program be taken out of 
the EU framework and given to a less politicized and bureaucratic governance mechanism?  
Services 
How should the services of Galileo be provided? Three levels of services have been 
proposed: an open access service (OAS); a commercial access service (CAS); and public service 
(consisting of safety-oriented and regulated services).  OAS will be provided free of charge to 
users and will have an accuracy of within 6 meters and a service availability of around 99%. The 
commercial service will include a charging mechanism to generate revenues. 
 One problem is whether the safety service should be encrypted.  The international civil 
aviation community has opposed encryption of the safety-critical services, arguing that it could 
jeopardize security.  Alcatel Space of France, the lead contractor of the GALA consortium 
comprising more than 60 firms, argued that the safety-critical service should not be encrypted in 
order to generate revenue.  Racal, on the other hand, which headed the GEMINUS consortium, 
preferred to have this service encrypted. 
  Disagreement has also focused on whether Galileo should include a communication 
payload to transfer navigation information.  The GEMINUS consortium argued that such a 
payload would generate additional sources of income through management of truck, taxi and bus   16
fleets. The European Commission supported this view.  The GALA consortium argued that no 
such communication payload should be included.  The GALA consortium stressed instead the 
importance of the mass market, and the professional and emergency services market segments, 
while the GEMINUS consortium stressed the safety services market segment.
18  
The public regulated services are aimed at emergency services, humanitarian operations 
and implementation of EU transport policies (such as road tolling, dangerous goods transport, 
etc). This service level has been linked to a political debate on the definition of security. While 
most European governments recognize the linkages between Galileo and security matters, they 
have differed on what is meant by security. A central issue is whether Galileo should provide a 
Governmental Access Service (GAS). The French government, in particular, has promoted the 
interpretation of security for Galileo as including military security. In addition, parts of the EC 
services are willing to work more with the so-called Pillar II of the EU, that is, the foreign policy 
and security domain. They may see Galileo as an opportunity to informally address the question 
of further incorporation of security issues into the jurisdiction of the European Community. The 
European Commission is not yet in a legal position to make any strong statements on military 
aspects, but this situation will probably change in the future.  
Military authorities within the EU Member States have taken part in planning discussions 
about Galileo at different levels, including at the highest level in working groups of the EU 
Galileo Steering Committee (the executive body that is chaired by the European Commission 
and that consists of EU government representatives).  The military have been particularly 
                                                 
18The European Commission has anticipated that Galileo will include a capability to improve the current Search and 
Rescue services (SAR). Involvement of the SAR service could provide a number of additional benefits. First, it 
could provide faster alerts and more accurate information to the SAR rescue center. Second, it could provide an 
acknowledgement function that would give the user in trouble a psychologically important confirmation that the call 
for rescue assistance has been received. The SAR service would also allow the broadcasting of messages to alert 
other users in the vicinity of a distress situation.   17
influential in the larger EU Member States.  No country has a single position on Galileo; 
different groups have different interests. Some governments, such as those of Germany, Sweden 
and the UK, stress that Galileo should be a purely commercial navigation system.  They argue 
that any government access service provision must be preceded by detailed cost/benefit 
comparison analyses.  What would be the added value of Galileo if it was to be perceived as 
partly a military-oriented system? The answer is uncertain since it is defined in technical, 
commercial and safety-of-life (emergency) terms, rather than in military terms. 
A Second-Order Topic: Backward Compatibility with Egnos 
Europe is currently developing a first-generation satellite navigation system, Egnos, which 
will go into operation around late 2003.  The objective in developing Egnos has been to enable 
industry to acquire the necessary expertise (and to demonstrate the European capability) for 
high-performance satellite navigation systems.  This effort is particularly aimed at the 
improvement of the civil aviation system.  Most European governments and their air traffic 
control organizations have invested in Egnos and have an interest in protecting those investments 
by ensuring backward compatibility, that is, building Galileo on and integrating it with Egnos.  
They have consistently requested information on how Egnos should be integrated into Galileo.  
Several governments, such as those of Denmark and Sweden,  have not committed 
themselves. Denmark has been reluctant to commit because of financial costs. Sweden 
deliberately stayed outside the development of Egnos for strategic-technical reasons.  In any 
case, the definition of “integration” presents a political problem.  Specifically, Egnos relies on a 
geostationary satellite constellation that provides poor coverage at northern latitudes.  Not 
surprisingly, the Swedish government saw no compelling justification for close integration of 
Egnos into Galileo.  Instead, it suggested that the scarce financial and intellectual resources   18
involved in European satellite development should be concentrated on building Galileo into a 
robust and high-performing infrastructure.  Interestingly, Norway, which might be expected to 
have similar strategic-technical concerns, has actually been more positive toward Egnos, 
apparently because of the stake that the Norwegian industry has in contracts for Egnos work. 
The Association of European Airlines (AEA) has also voiced strong opposition to Egnos. 
It is worried that the airlines would have to pay for both the development and the deployment of 
Egnos, as well as for Galileo.  It criticized the European Commission’s failure to promote 
Galileo as a commercial venture that took the interests of the civil aviation community into 
account.  The AEA’s criticisms are important because it, and the whole civil aviation 
community, have considerable political and economic power.  While European governments 
pointed out that the civil aviation market is likely to be only a small share of the market, the 
European Commission has to make sure that the air transport industry is satisfied that it will only 
have to pay for receiving additional services that it can actually use.  The airlines (as Egnos 
opponents) and air traffic control organizations (who are Egnos supporters) eventually reached 
an agreement when governments gave them satisfactory answers regarding the question of 
payment.  
The protection of the interests of smaller European countries, not least those ESA Member 
States that are not members of the EU (Switzerland and Norway), constitutes a further, if 
unofficial, problem.  At a time when industry is shifting to commercial production and is 
envisaging a larger role for the EU in the space sector, smaller countries with weaker space 
agencies and industries are anxious that they will be left behind.  Smaller countries strongly 
support ESA, which has as an aim the balancing of national interests.  ESA distributes contracts   19
to industry throughout Europe to assure ESA governments that they will receive contracts in 
return for their investments in ESA.  
Implications 
There are essentially four general justifications for moving ahead with Galileo: technical; 
political; industrial; and macro-economic.  
Technical Performance 
Regarding technical performance, Galileo is expected to increase the integrity, accuracy 
and availability of current GPS signals.  In terms of integrity, the user with a GPS receiver is 
currently not informed in real time of service errors and does not know whether a signal is 
reliable or not.  Secondly, the accuracy of current signals for civil applications must be improved 
for particularly safety-critical and emergency applications.  Finally, service is not available in 
some areas because current signals are too poor – a problem in urban areas and in northern 
Europe, where Galileo is expected to improve performance considerably. 
Sovereignty and Security 
Satellite-based applications and services are of strategic value to Europe.  Politically, they 
represent an instrument of global influence, since independent satellite capabilities ensure control 
of the information gathered. The development of Galileo will provide Europe with an 
independent satellite system and a navigation infrastructure.  Moreover, it will challenge the 
current de facto monopoly of GPS by the United States and still provide Europe with control 
over its own system.  Without an active and timely European commitment to Galileo, Europe’s 
safety-critical transport needs have to depend on a system that is not under European control. 
  A basic question is therefore whether governments can acquiesce in a situation in which 
Europe’s safety-critical services and transport infrastructure continue to depend on navigation   20
systems that are completely outside of European control.  The US government has indicated 
from the outset that it envisaged no “real transatlantic partnership” (that is, joint ownership and 
control of GPS), citing military and industrial policy reasons.  This led (as might be expected and 
was probably anticipated) to a demand for development of a European system.  In a 1995 report 
to the US Congress and Department of Defense (prepared by the US National Academy of 
Public Administration/National Research Council), the authors argue that GPS hardware, 
software and services constitute an important export market that must be promoted: 
 
For several reasons, it is in the US interest to see GPS become widely 
accepted and employed around the world.  First, the globalization  
of GPS markets provides an economic stimulus to firms in the  
growing US GPS industry, many of which already rely on exports   
for a significant share of their revenues.  Second, technological 
preeminence is an important pillar of national power.  The acceptance 
of GPS as the world standard for position, velocity, and timing 
applications enhances the position of the US and allows it to lead 
in one important part of the process of technological and economic 
globalization. Third, US national security is well served by the  
international acceptance of GPS […]  The international acceptance 
of GPS would also slow the development of alternative satellite radio- 
navigation systems, the adverse use of which could be more difficult 
for the US military to control or counter in wartime.
19  
 
Considering that the world GPS market was projected at around $ 31 billion in 2005, and that the 
US GPS industry dominated the equipment market, there was a strong interest in protecting the 
preeminent position of US industry.  Concerns emerged when Europe initiated attempts to 
participate in the field of satellite navigation:   
“For geopolitical or economic reasons (the report continued), a number of foreign 
governments have adopted policies detrimental to the spread of commercial GPS. For 
example, the European Commission wants to implement a common European 
navigational transport network that will rely on radio-navigation systems […] European 
governments worry about the political leverage and commercial advantages that may 
                                                 
19NAPA/NRC, National Academy of Public Administration/National Research Council (1995),  The Global 
Positioning System: Charting the Future, Report for the US Congress and Department of Defense, pp.14-15 
(Washington, DC: National Academy Press).    21
accrue to the US as the owner, operator, and manager of a system upon which so many 
other nations increasingly depend. Further, they are concerned that DoD’s dominance of 
GPS policy-making and management may result in a lack of attention to civilian needs”.
20  
 
The report  concluded that it was not likely that Europe would get its act together. 
“European apprehensions regarding US dominance and control of GPS are not confined to any 
particular nation, nor do they represent a united position within any country.  In fact, no single 
nation, let alone the European Union, appears able to unite in opposition to GPS.”
21  
Translated into policy objectives, the European Commission stressed that a “real 
partnership” required a full European role in systems development and operation, guarantees of 
adequate control of satellite signals, and the opportunity for European industry to compete on 
equal terms.
22  In common with many officials interviewed by the author, a French official stated 
that Europe must move ahead quickly to avoid remaining “under the yoke of an American 
monopoly”.  
Military location capabilities and air transport safety would be subject  
to American standards and entirely in the hands of the US. Given  
the weakness in Europe’s communication, navigation and observation  
systems already highlighted by the recent conflict in Kosovo,  
this would be unacceptable.
23  
 
Moreover, although the present basic service provided by GPS is free, GPS operators may 
decide in the future to charge for the use of GPS.  In such a scenario, the EU would have no 
influence on the fixing of charges.  It could not guarantee that the currently free-of charge 
                                                 
20NAPA/NRC, National Academy of Public Administration/National Research Council (1995),  The 
Global Positioning System: Charting the Future, Report for the US Congress and Department of Defense, 
pp.39/42 (Washington, DC: National Academy Press).  
21NAPA/NRC, National Academy of Public Administration/National Research Council (1995),  The 
Global Positioning System: Charting the Future, Report for the US Congress and Department of Defense, 
p.45 (Washington, DC: National Academy Press).  
22Commission of the European Communities (1999), Galileo: Global Satellite Navigation Services for 
Europe. Meeting of the Council of EU Ministers of Transport, 17 June, Luxembourg.   22
services will not be subject to intentional degradation through jamming.  Further, without 
developing its own system, Europe will remain subjected to a de facto monopoly.  Europe should 
certainly expect that the US will retain its right to restrict access to the GPS signal in time of war. 
Generally, there is a need to provide a backup system since the risk of loss of the signal should 
be assumed.  Such a backup system is also favored by air traffic control organizations in Europe 
since it would provide them with better guarantees of functionality.  In sum, establishing a 
European global satellite system has to face at the outset the basic question of whether it will 
relate to the existing US-owned GPS system, which is militarily-owned and paid for by US 
taxpayers. 
Industrial Considerations and Satellite Application Markets 
The “political-industrial dimension of Galileo” has been translated into the goal of moving 
from “dominance of the US industries to a fair international competition in mass markets for user 
equipment and services”.
24  Galileo has the potential to contribute substantially to the European 
economy.  Two central aspects of this contribution are (1) the industrial, economic and strategic 
importance of access to and control of specifications and standards, and (2) the central role of the 
satellite applications market segments.  
First, whoever defines the requirements, develops the specifications and sets the 
standards for satellite signals and equipment will have tremendous commercial leverage, and will 
gain a head start over commercial rivals.  Since GPS standards are effectively set by the US 
Department of Defense (DOD), and US Administration policy officially aims to support GPS 
worldwide through its associated industry, it is crucial to ensure access to specifications for 
                                                                                                                                                       
23Salomon, Arnaud (1999), ‘A Question of Independence and Sovereignty’,  CNES Magazine, No. 6 
(August), p. 20-21. Director of space and aeronautics, French Ministry of Education, Research and 
Technology.   23
industries in other parts of the world, including the European industry.  The US industry already 
dominates the market for GPS equipment and naturally wants to maintain its global leadership.  
Secondly, European governments, the European Commission, and the European industry 
view satellite navigation applications as the most important future markets.  The experience of 
Europe’s lagging position in the world market for computer operating systems and software has 
shown the costs of dependence associated with applications.  Time is running short, however, 
because more and more applications in Europe and elsewhere are becoming dependent on GPS; 
such dependence is a critical problem (Europeans argue) because GPS has no functional 
guarantee – if it fails, there is currently no back-up system.  
Galileo is intended to be an integral part of European traffic policy.  It would enable 
implementation of a harmonized traffic management system based on a satellite navigation and 
positioning service and complementary data communication.  Satellite navigation can improve 
traffic management through the new technological possibilities of satellite navigation-based 
telematics.  In the civil aviation sector, the application of satellite navigation, combined with a 
suitable communication system, would offer shorter routes, quicker access to airports through 
simplified navigation procedures, and would enable precise final approach and landing at most 
airports, thereby improving passenger safety and reducing the cost of ground infrastructure.  
Satellite navigation can provide a more efficient use of the existing aircraft fleet and airport 
infrastructure. In the maritime sector, satellite navigation is used for safety-critical navigation, 
fishery control, container tracking (fleet management) and maritime distress systems.  In the 
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railway sector, satellite-based rail applications may be used for fleet management, signaling and 
train control, although these applications are still at an early stage.
25 
In addition, satellite navigation is used for many non-transport applications. In the 
agricultural sector, satellite navigation can be used to minimize fertilizer and pesticide usage and 
to maximize yield (‘precision farming’).  Satellite positioning plays a central role in offshore 
exploration (for example, for exploration work, the operation and servicing of platforms, and the 
precise allocation of claims).  There are also applications for surveying purposes, for example, to 
help determine deformations of dams at a very detailed level.  Finally, satellites can provide a 
global time reference (the timing market), mainly for the synchronization of communication 
systems.  Galileo will potentially promote opportunities for European industry to participate in 
all areas of the GNSS market and to develop the European market for added-value applications. 
Macro-Economic Implications 
EU governments have announced as a long-term strategic goal that the EU should  
“become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by around 
2010”.  Galileo, in their view, would provide Europe with wider economic and social benefits 
(that is, apart from the direct benefits to suppliers and users).  Based on the investment and 
operating cost of Galileo, the European Commission predicted in the late 1990s that more than 
100,000 new and high technology jobs would be created between 2005 and 2025.  In 2001, 
Commissioner Palacio claimed that Galileo would create 140,000 jobs and a potential market of 
Euro 9 billion a year.  In addition, in the same period, Galileo would lead to Euro 200 billion in 
indirect savings for each one percent reduction in travel time in road transport alone.  Galileo 
would help to reduce traffic congestion, safety and pollution and thus make government 
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spending more efficient.  The diagram below presents a profile of projected annual benefits that 
would accrue from Europe’s participation in the satellite navigation market.  The cumulative 
total benefits over the period 2001-2020 (Euro 74 billion) can be divided as follows: producer 
benefits (Euro 12.2 billion), social benefits (Euro 5.6 billion) and user benefits (Euro 56.2 
billion), with investment and operating costs amounting to Euro 7 billion over the same period.  
The industry presented these estimates to the European Commission and EU Member States in 
early 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 1: Profile of annual benefits of European satellite navigation. Source: Astrium, 2001. 
Choices for Europe 
Forecasts about the costs and benefits of European engagement in satellite navigation are 
difficult to assess because of the high degree of uncertainty and the often-contradictory reports 
from the actors involved.  In Europe, there is a heated debate about  the extent to which satellite 
navigation should initially be a publicly or a privately funded market.  This situation is not 
Profile of Annual 
Benefits 
-
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
2
0
1
7
2
0
1
8
2
0
1
9
2
0
2
0
M
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
e
u
r
o
Total producer benefits Total user benefits Total social benefit  26
unusual in relation to the development of large-scale projects.  The European Airbus 380 project, 
which will produce the largest transport aircraft ever built, has been involved in a similar debate. 
US industry spearheaded by Boeing has repeatedly claimed that airlines will not be interested in 
superjumbos.  In late March 2001, Boeing management announced that it had given up its plans 
to develop a superjumbo in direct competition with Airbus to pursue instead a different type of 
commercial jet, which could enter service around the same time as the European Galileo 
system.
26 
The European Commission has stressed the need to ensure that the EU is not locked out of 
the market for satellite-based services which could be worth $50 billion a year by 2005.
27  The 
main market focus has shifted to the promise of land transportation, which is expected to provide  
nearly 80% of Galileo's potential market.  This sector includes cars, trucks, and fleet 
management and assumes the integration of Galileo capabilities with mobile phone services.  
The EU estimates that there will be a potential market for navigation equipment in Europe of 
around Euro 122 billion for 2005-2023, with an expected market for services of Euro 113 billion 
and an export market of Euro 50 billion during the same period.  
The European space industry and the future Galileo operator would enjoy value-added 
benefits of around Euro 190 million annually, with an extra Euro 740 million during the 
deployment phase.  The Galileo users’ net benefits, which would climb steadily, would amount 
to around Euro 8 million by 2020.  Rough estimates of economic and social benefits down to 
2020 are Euro 62 and 12 billion, respectively.  Moreover, according to the European 
                                                 
26Boeing, which had failed to win a single order by spring 2001, instead decided to focus its resources to 
develop a longer-range commercial jet designed to carry between 100 and 300 passengers. The new 
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27Commission of the European Communities (1999), Galileo: Global Satellite Navigation Services for 
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Commission, the European market for terminals could amount to Euro 370 million worth of 
produced terminals by 2020.
28  The table below shows the breakdown of market size (in 
monetary terms) by application area as predicted for 2005. 
 
Market segment  1999 (M€)  2005 (M€)  % growth 
Aviation – products & services  44  65  48 
Commercial maritime  4  6  50 
Car navigation – products & services  680  1 920  182 
Fleet management  – products & 
services 
40  90  125 
Rail  1  24  140 
Surveying & mapping, off-shore  49  86  76 
Agriculture   5  12  140 
Augmentation services  45  60  33 
Mobile communication (excl. services)  0  6 000  6000 
Timing  6  10  67 
Personal navigation  50  90  80 
Total European GNSS market  935  8 383  795 
 
Figure 2: GNSS market segments for Europe. Source: European Commission
 29 
 
The European Commission expects all markets to grow, with the largest growth occurring in the 
mobile communications market.  The market for mobile positioning services would start from 
zero since no mobile phones were equipped with GPS positioning devices.  It is expected to 
                                                 
28Genesis Office (2000), Galileo Newsletter, No. 10, December. 
29Commission of the European Communities (2001), Summary of Market Analysis Results for Galileo, 
January; Commission of the European Communities (2000), Galileo: Situation Report. Interim Report to 
the Transport Council of 28 June, Brussels.    28
amount to around Euro 6 billion (assuming partial GNSS localization in mobile communication) 
or a  20 billion (assuming mandatory GNSS localization in mobile communication) by 2005.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The European GNSS market in 1999 and 2005. Source: European Commission.
30 
 
All such estimates are uncertain, because of uncertainties about the technology.  The 
take-off of satellite navigation services will depend on the future choice of positioning 
technology chosen for integration into mobile phones.  Tough competition is likely over 
network-based positioning services.  The European Commission reasons that added value such 
as greater accuracy, global coverage, and proven technology will increase the chances of satellite 
navigation technology being chosen.  But the best technology does not always win the day. The 
figure above shows the relative size of various market segments.  Substantial growth is expected 
                                                 
30Commission of the European Communities (2001), Summary of Market Analysis Results for Galileo, 
January; Commission of the European Communities (2000), Galileo: Situation Report, Interim Report to 
the Transport Council of 28 June, Brussels.  
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in the car navigation market, but the European Commission  believes that the mobile 
communications market will overtake it. 
Regarding possible revenue streams, European governments, industry and user groups have 
discussed in particular two possible alternatives: a general levy on receivers, and controlled 
access services.  Germany and France suggest that a levy on GNSS receivers should be explored 
in order to strengthen the GNSS-2 business plan.  One suggestion being studied is to ask the EU 
to require that every car be equipped with a Galileo receiver and a wireless communications 
device to convey the car's position to a control center.  The justification for requiring satellite 
navigation might come from a need to control traffic on Europe's increasingly congested 
highways.  Moreover, a significant revenue stream may be generated by a levy on receivers. 
However, this levy will have to differentiate between various user functions so as not to impede 
the development of a GNSS mass market.  The introduction of a levy on receivers will depend on 
the political will of European governments to implement such a measure throughout Europe.  
A controlled access service implies that the signal would be available on a subscriber 
basis, would come with guarantees as to its availability, and could be certified.  Such an 
approach would be feasible for applications such as road pricing, tracking and tracing, fishery 
surveillance, and precision farming.  Any mandatory measure would obviously depend on the 
willingness of public authorities to support it.  The financial return to governments through direct 
and indirect taxes would amount to around Euro 45 billion, which might represent twenty times 
the initial up-front investment.  
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Figure 4: The Main Emerging Markets for Galileo. Source: Astrium, 2001. 
Concluding Remarks 
A clear decision by the EU Member States to firmly commit funding and political support 
for satellite navigation and Galileo is imperative. Active support would constitute an 
endorsement of Europe’s high technology ambitions and a political recognition of an ambitious 
European federal program.  Europe is being offered an opportunity to assume a leading role in 
satellite navigation on a global scale.  Not to commit politically to Galileo would mean that 
Europe is willing to remain on the sidelines and to bow to continued US global dominance. 
Satellite navigation is a high-technology, high-capability industry.  Nevertheless, its 
development involves considerable uncertainty.  In addition, as this paper has shown, political 
problems remain.  During spring 2001, France reduced its emphasis on exploring the military 
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potential of Galileo.  Together with Italy and Spain, France accepted that the system would be 
used strictly for civilian purposes under private sector control.  On the other hand, Germany has 
softened its demand for a dominant private sector role early on, although the Netherlands in 
particular continues to call for clearer wording on the role of the private sector.  
A final decision on funding of the Galileo development phase is not expected until 
December 2001. Since Galileo is designed to both compete, and be complementary, with the US 
GPS system, timely implementation of Galileo is important. The US GPS industry and 
government are, of course, less enthusiastic about the European ambitions to strengthen Europe’s 
commercial and strategic independence.  
A central question is how to keep the implementation of advanced mobile wireless 
infrastructures compatible with satellite navigation.  The EU gave regulatory and political 
backing to the high-speed mobile cellular communications in the 1990s.  The question will no 
doubt arise how this European undertaking (which goes under the name Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System, UMTS) will fit into Europe’s efforts in the skies through satellite 
navigation.  It is not yet clear whether Europe’s ambitions in mobile cellular communications 
will pay off in light of strong Japanese and increasing Korean competition, along with growing 
American markets.  If the European UMTS system becomes another export success, and the 
European Galileo system is closely integrated with it, the initiative will have paid off. However, 
this is a high-risk game where the outcome is uncertain.  What investors normally try to do under 
such circumstances is to hedge their risks or to sit on the fence.  However, customers, not 
politicians, will choose what technology they want to use.  The increased use of mobile terminals 
together with wireless technology will pave the way for completely new services and lead to 
mobile multimedia terminals.  Mobile telephony already has location and positioning service   32
capability and this market will most likely grow considerably in the years to come.  Can Galileo 
and future mobile telephony, therefore, interact and come together? 
In terms of institutional arrangements, the Galileo program can provide a stepping-stone 
and an example for more formal and permanent relations between the EU and other 
organizations, not least the European Space Agency (ESA).  The European Commission and 
ESA have worked together through ad hoc arrangements.  They need to harmonize different 
decision-making procedures, institutional arrangements, and working practices.  
Finally, regarding international cooperation and interoperability, the European Galileo 
system should be made interoperable with GPS in a cost-effective way to increase performance 
for the benefit of service providers, large user communities and individual end-users around the 
world.  The European program should remain open to international cooperation and partners 
(such as Brazil, Japan, Turkey, and Russia).  While meeting European strategic, industrial and 
economic requirements, Galileo provides a unique opportunity to develop a truly global Europe 
satellite navigation system.  Users worldwide could benefit from a truly seamless, interoperable 
global navigation satellite architecture more capable and reliable than any one system alone.  
While assuming a world economic and technological position, Europe must respect the concerns 
and needs of third countries.  Furthermore, Galileo has to be global since (1) safety-related 
applications in the civil aviation or shipping sectors using transport networks integrated across 
boundaries demand a global system, and (2) manufacturers want to market interoperable user 
equipment directly for global markets. 